In this paper, we provide new estimates of skilled workers' emigration rates for about 190 countries in 2000 and 170 countries in 1990, including both developing and industrial countries. Using various statistical sources, we revisit Carrington and Detragiache's measures by incorporating information on immigrants' educational attainment and country of origin from almost all OECD countries. Our database covers 92.7 percent of the OECD immigration stock. In absolute terms, we show that the largest numbers of highly educated migrants are from Europe, Southern and Eastern Asia and, to a lesser extent, Central America. Nevertheless, as a proportion of the potential educated labor force, the highest brain drain rates are observed in the Caribbean, Central America, Western and Eastern Africa. Repeating the exercise for 1990 and 2000 allows us to evaluate the changes in brain drain intensity. Western Africa, Eastern Africa and Central America experienced a remarkable increase in the brain drain during the past decade.
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Until recently, there has been no systematic empirical assessment of the economic impact of the brain drain. Despite many case studies and anecdotal evidence, the main reason for this seems to be the lack of harmonized international data on migration by country of origin and education level. An exception is the paper by Carrington and Detragiache (1998) which provided skilled migration rates for 61 developing countries in 1990. This study relies on a set of tentative assumptions. For example, they transpose the skill structure of US immigrants on the OECD total immigration stock.
In this paper, we provide new estimates of skilled workers' emigration rates for about 190 countries in 2000 and 170 countries in 1990, including both developing and industrial countries. Using various statistical sources, we revisit Carrington and Detragiache's measures by incorporating information on immigrants' educational attainment and country of origin from almost all OECD countries. The set of receiving countries is restricted to OECD nations. Our database covers 92.7 percent of the OECD immigration stock.
In absolute terms, we show that the largest numbers of highly educated migrants are from Europe, Southern and Eastern Asia and, to a lesser extent, from Central America. Nevertheless, as a proportion of the potential educated labor force, the highest brain drain rates are observed in the Caribbean, Central America, and Western and Eastern Africa. Repeating the exercise for 1990 and 2000 allows us to evaluate the changes in brain drain intensity. Western Africa, Eastern Africa and Central America experienced a remarkable increase in the brain drain during the past decade.
Our database delivers information that is rich enough to assess the changes in the international distribution of migration rates, to test for the (push and pull) determinants per skill group, to evaluate the growth effects of migration on source and destination countries or to estimate the relationships between migration, trade, foreign R&D and remittances.
Introduction
In a narrow economic sense, brain drain denotes the international transfers of human resources. Such transfers have undergone extensive scrutiny in developing countries, but also in industrial countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom or Germany, where an important fraction of talented workers are working abroad. There is a fair amount of evidence suggesting that the brain drain is now much more extensive than it was 2 or 3 decades ago. For example, Haque and Jahangir (1999) indicate that the number of highly skilled emigrants from Africa increased from 1,800 a year on average during the 1960-75 period to 4,400 during 1975-84 and 23,000 during 1984-87. These trends were con…rmed in the 1990s in the face of the increasingly "qualityselective" immigration policies introduced in many OECD countries 1 . Since 1984, Australia's immigration policy has o¢cially privileged skilled workers, with the candidates being selected according to their prospective "contribution to the Australian economy". Canadian immigration policy follows similar lines, resulting in an increasing share of highly educated people among the selected immigrants; for example, in 1997, 50,000 professional specialists and entrepreneurs immigrated in Canada with 75,000 additional family members, representing 58% of total immigration. In the US, since the Immigration Act of 1990 -followed by the American Competitiveness and Work Force Improvement Act of 1998 -emphasis has been put on the selection of highly skilled workers, through a system of quotas favoring candidates with academic degrees and/or speci…c professional skills. For the latter category, the annual number of visas issued for highly skilled professionals (H-1B visas) increased from 110,200 in 1992 to 355,600 in 2000, the totality of this increase being due to immigration from developing countries. About half of these workers now come from India. In EU countries, immigration policies are less clear and still oriented toward traditional targets such as asylum seekers and applicants requesting family reunion. However, there is some evidence suggesting that European countries are also leaning toward becoming quality-selective. As reported in Lowell (2002b) , "European Commission President Prodi has called for up to 1.7 million immigrants to …ll a EU-wide labor shortage through a system similar to the US green cards for quali…ed immigrants". A growing number of EU countries (including France, Ireland and the UK) have recently introduced programs aiming at attracting a quali…ed workforce (especially in the …eld of information, communication and technology -ICT) through the creation of labor-shortage occupation lists (see Lowell, 2002a) . In Germany in February 2000, Chancelor Schröder announced plans to recruit additional specialists in the …eld of information technology. The Green cards came into force in August 2001, giving German ICT-…rms the opportunity to hire up to 20,000 non-EU ICT-specialists for a maximum of …ve years. More recently, the German Sübmuth-Commission recom-mended the introduction of a coherent ‡exible migration policy that allows for both temporary and permanent labor migrants (see Bauer and Kunze, 2004) . In France, the Ministry of Labor established in 2002 a system to induce highly skilled workers from outside the EU to live and work in France. Given the apparent demographic problems and the aging of populations, the intensity of the brain drain could increase further during the next decades 2 . What are the consequences for sending countries? The early literature -which dates back to the 1960s and 1970s (Grubel and Scott, 1966, Johnson, 1967 , Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974, Kwok and Leland, 1982 ) -supports the view that skilled migration is bad for those left behind. This is the case if the migrants' contribution to the economy is greater than his/her marginal product and/or if the education of skilled emigrants was partly funded by taxes on residents. The negative e¤ects of the brain drain for source countries have been reformulated in an endogenous growth framework (Miyagiwa, 1991 , Haque and Kim, 1995 , Wong and Yip, 1999 . More recently, the e¤ects of migration prospects on human capital formation have been the focus of several studies (Mountford, 1997 , Stark et al., 1998 , Vidal, 1998 , Beine et al., 2001 , suggesting that such prospects may in fact foster human capital formation and growth in sending countries. The essence of the argument is that if the return to education is higher abroad than at home, the possibility of migration increases the expected return to human capital, thereby enhancing domestic enrollment in education 3 . More people, therefore, invest in human capital as a result of increased migration opportunities. This acquisition can contribute positively to growth and economic performance. Alongside the incentives to acquire education, other channels through which the brain drain may positively a¤ect the sending economy have also been proposed. These include a range of "feedback e¤ects" such as remittances (Cinar and Docquier, 2004) , return migration after additional knowledge (Stark and Helmenstein, 1997, Domingues Dos Santos and Postel Vinay, 2003) and skills have been acquired abroad, and the creation of business and trade networks (Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002, Mesnard and Ravallion, 2002) Understanding and measuring all the mechanisms at work would obviously help designing adequate policy responses to the brain drain. Until recently, there has been no systematic empirical assessment of the economic impact of the brain drain. Despite many case studies and anecdotal evidence, the main reason for this seems to be the lack of harmonized international data on migration by country of origin and education level (see Commander et al, 2004 ). In the absence of such empirical material, the debate has remained almost exclusively theoretical. In their in ‡uential contribution, Detragiache (1998, 1999) provided estimates of the emigration rates of tertiary educated workers for 61 developing countries. These estimates are based on three main statistical sources (US Census data on the skill structure of immigration, OECD data on immigration per country of origin, Barro and Lee (2000) data describing the skill structure in sending countries). They had to rely on a set of assumptions. First, for non-US countries, they use OCDE migration statistics which report limited information on the origin of immigrants 4 . Second, they transpose the skill structure of US immigrants on the OECD total immigration stock. For example, migrants from South Africa to Great Britain are assumed to be distributed across educational categories in the same way as migrants from South Africa to the United States. This assumption is particularly tentative for countries which do not send many migrants to the United States. Adams (2003) used the same methodology to update the emigration rates of 24 labor-exporting countries in 2000. Beine et al (2003) used Carrington and Detragiache's data to predict the growth impact of the brain drain. Yet, given the assumptions, the evidence concerning the consequences of skilled migration for developing countries remains not only limited but also largely inconclusive.
The purpose of this paper is to build an exhaustive international database on the brain drain describing the loss of skilled workers for all developing and developed countries. The majority of high-skilled workers go to industrialized countries. Building on Carrington and Detragiache (1998) and Adams (2003) , we focus on the South-North and North-North brain drain. We are aware that a brain drain can be observed outside the OECD area (migration of skilled workers to the Gulf countries, South Africa, Malaysia, Hong-Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, etc) but, at this stage, we do not take these ‡ows into account 5 . We collected data on the immigration structure by educational attainment and country of birth from all OECD receiving countries. Census and register data are (or will be) available for about 25 countries in 2000 (out of 30 OECD countries). To allow comparison between 1990 and 2000, we consider the same number of receiving countries in 1990 (even if six of them were not members of the OECD). Census data are (or will be) available for about 18 countries in 1990. Survey data and reasonable assumptions can be used to evaluate the structure of immigration in the remaining countries.
In this release of the database, we also use survey data for countries in which the Census is not yet available in the desired format (i.e. for 12 European countries). At this stage, we estimate that we are able to characterize the country of birth and the educational attainment of 92.7 percent of the OECD stock of adult immigrants in 4 OCDE statistics su¤er from various limitations (see OCDE, 2002) . For example, they only provide information on the country of origin for the the main sending countries. In 2000, they are not avalaible for Greece, Iceland, Mexico, Slovakia, Turkey. 5 According to the United Nations (2002), migration to developed countries represented 53 percent of the world migration in 1990 and 60 percent in 2000. High-skill migration is even more concentrated. In this study, we estimate that about 85 percent of high-skill migrants go to OECD countries. 5 2000 (and 88.8% of the stock in 1990). For the remaining 7.3 percent (11.2 percent in 1990), we usually have information on the country of origin but have to extrapolate the skill structure on the basis of available information. In the spirit of the Carrington and Detragiache or Adams studies, a method based on the US census requires extrapolating the skill structure on the basis of 42 percent of the total OECD stock (36 percent in 1990). Our paper is a strong improvement on earlier e¤orts.
Our method allows to distinguish about 190 sending countries in 2000 and 170 countries in 1990 (before the secession of the Soviet block, ex-Yugoslavia and exCzechoslovakia). Our measures can be used to examine the changes in the international distribution of migration rates, to test for the (push and pull) determinants per skill group, or to evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of migration on source and destination countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology. Emigration rates for 1990 and 2000 are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the key indicators of skilled migration. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Methodology
This section describes the methodology and the data sources used to compute emigration rates of skilled workers for a large set of sending countries. Building on Carrington and Detragiache, we de…ne the brain drain as the proportion of working age individuals (aged 25 and over) with at least tertiary educational attainment, born in a given country but living in another country, taking into account neither their occupation, nor where education took place, nor when they arrived. To build such indicators, we proceed in two steps. We …rst compute emigration stocks by educational attainment from all countries of the world. Then, we evaluate these numbers as a proportion of the labor force born in the sending country. This gives emigration rates per educational attainment.
These two steps rely on various assumptions. We distinguish the general assumptions required when all existing data are collected and the speci…c assumptions inherent to this particular release of the database (some information is estimated on the basis of survey data). These speci…c assumptions will be progressively relaxed as new o¢cial statistics become available.
Step 1 -Emigration stocks
International emigration data are usually not available or of bad quality. Hence, brain drain can only be captured by aggregating consistent immigration data collected in receiving countries. Information about the origin and skill of natives and immigrants is available from national population Censuses. More speci…cally, country i's Census usually identi…es individuals on the basis of age, country of birth j, and skill level s.
Methodology. Our method consists in collecting Census or register data from a large set of receiving countries, with the highest level of detail on birth countries and (at least) three levels of educational attainment: s = h for high skilled, s = m for medium skilled, s = l for low skilled and s = u for unknown. Low skilled workers are those with primary education (or with 0 to 8 years of schooling in countries where the highest diploma is not provided); medium skilled workers are those with secondary education (9 to 12 years of schooling); high skilled workers are those with tertiary education (13 years and above). The unknowns are either due to the fact that some immigrants did not declare their educational attainment or to the absence of data in some receiving countries. Educational categories are built on the basis of country speci…c information and are compatible with Barro and Lee data on education in the sending countries. A mapping between the country educational classi…cation is sometimes required to harmonize the data 6 . Let M i;j t;s denote the stock of adult individuals born in j, of skill s, living in country i at time t.
Building an aggregate measure of emigration per educational attainment requires a rule for sharing the unknown values. Two resonable rules could be considered: either unknown values can be distributed in the same way as the known values or they can be assimilated to unskilled. We combine both rules depending on the information available in the receiving country. For receiving countries where information about immigrants' education is available, we assimilate unknowns to unskilled workers. For example, Australian immigrants who did not mention their educational attainment are considered as unskilled. In receiving countries where no information about skill is available, we transpose the skill distribution observed in the rest of the OECD area. Note that the latter skill distribution is speci…c to each country of birth. For example, if we have no information about the skill structure of immigrants to Italy, Algerian emigrants to Italy are assumed to be distributed in the same way as Algerian emigrants to the rest of the OECD area.
Formally, the stocks of emigrants of skill s from country j at time t (M :j t;s ) are obtained as follows:
where¨i t is a (time and country dependent) binary variable equal to one if there is no data on the immigrants' skill in country i, and equal to zero otherwise.
Shortcomings. Our methodology is imperfect and could be improved in many ways. However, we believe that our estimates can be reasonably used to examine the changes in the international distribution of migration rates, to test for the (push and pull) determinants of skilled migration. Let us discuss some shortcomings.
A …rst limit of our analysis is that the set of receiving countries is restricted to OECD nations. Generally speaking, the skill level of immigrants in non-OECD countries is expected to be very low, except in a few countries such as South Africa (1.3 million immigrants in 2000), the Gulf countries (9.6 million immigrants in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Barhain, Oman and Qatar), some Eastern Asian countries (4 million immigrants in Hong-Kong and Singapore only). According to their census data, about 17.5 percent of adult immigrants are tertiary educated in these countries (17 percent in Bahrain, 17.2 percent in Saudi Arabia, 14 percent in Kuwait, 18.7 in South Africa). Considering that children constitute 25 percent of the immigration stock, we estimate the number of educated workers at 1.9 million in these countries. The number of educated people in the rest of the world lies between 1 and 4 million (if the proportion of educated immigrants among adults lies between 2.5 and 10 percent). This implies that focusing on OECD countries, we should capture a large fraction of the world-wide educated immigration (about 85 percent). Nevertheless, we are aware that by disregarding non-OECD immigration countries, we probably underestimate the brain drain for a dozen of developing countries (such as Egypt, Sudan, Jordan in the neighborhood of the Gulf States, Namibia, Zimbabwe and other countries which send emigrants to South Africa, etc.).
Another point is that, by focusing on census and register data, our methodology does not capture illegal immigration for which systematic statistics by education level and country of origin are not available. Because illegal immigrants are mostly less educated, we obviously overestimate the average level of education of the immigrant population. Nevertheless, this limit should not signi…cantly distort our estimates of the migration rate of highly skilled workers.
Only taking into consideration the population aged 25 and over maximizes the comparability of the immigration population with the Barro and Lee data on educational attainment in source countries. It also excludes a large number of students who emigrated to complete their education. We cannot control for graduate students aged 25 and over completing their schooling 7 . Note that, in a limited number of OECD countries identi…ed below, we are unable to distinguish between young and adult immigrants.
A related problem is that we have no information on the age of entry. It is therefore impossible to distinguish between immigrants who were educated at the time of their arrival and those who acquired education after they settled in the receiving country; for example, Mexican-born individuals who arrived in the US at age 5 or 10 and graduated from US high-education institutions are counted as highly-skilled immigrants. Hence, our de…nition of the brain drain is clearly determined by data availability. Existing data do not allow us to systematically eliminate foreign-born individuals arrived with completed schooling or after a given age threshold. In the US, the proportion of foreign born who arrived before age 15 (i.e. those who spent part of their schooling time in the US) represents 7.5 percent of the immigration stock. Since we have no systematic data for the other countries, we cannot control for children immigration.
Finally, the concept of immigration is not fully homogenous between countries. When the information exists, we de…ne migration on the basis of the country of birth rather than citizenship. This concept is recommended by the United Nations 8 and better captures the decision to emigrate 9 . Another reason is that the concept of country of birth is time invariant, contrary to citizenship which changes with naturalization. The OECD statistics report that 14.4 millions of foreign born were naturalized between 1991 and 2000. Countries where the number of acquisitions of citizenship is particularly high are the US (5.6 million), Germany (2.2 million), Canada (1.6 million), Australia and France (1.1 million). Data by country of birth are available in a large majority of OECD countries. However, for some countries, immigrants are only classi…ed by citizenship (Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan and Korea).
The …rst six columns in table 1 describe the availability of immigration data in OECD countries as well as the statistical sources. Some of these data are not available yet. Hence, provisory assumptions are used in this release of the database. In the 26 countries (25 Census/Registers and Greece) where data on educational attainment will be available, we are usually able to work on the population aged 25 and over. However, this age limit is slightly di¤erent in some countries (18 in Switzerland, 15 in New Zealand, 13 in Poland). This should not distort our measure of the skilled immigration stock signi…cantly. Contrary to common belief, data on country of birth are available in a large majority of countries, even in European countries. The concept of citizenship must only be used for Germany, Italy, as well as for Greece (European Council data are based on the concept of citizenship), Japan and Korea.
Data available in 1990. The methodology is similar for 1990. To allow comparisons between 1990 and 2000, we consider the same number of receiving countries in 1990 (even if Hungary, Poland, ex-Czechoslovakia, Korea and Mexico were not members of the OECD). Our counterfactual 1990 OECD zone includes 29 countries (Slovakia and the Czech Republic were uni…ed). We estimate the total stock of adult immigrants in the OECD area at 39.844 million. Mexico is still the only country for which data on age, country of birth and educational attainment are missing (0.341 million immigrants). Data on immigrants' age and educational attainment are not available in ex-Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Japan, Iceland, Korea and Greece (2.641 million immigrants). However, combining European Council data and the European Labor Force Survey provides a good approximation for Greece and Italy (0.646 million adult immigrants). In the other 20 countries (36.862 million adult immigrants), Census or register data are (or will be) available. Adding Censuses, Italian and Greek surveys, we capture 37.508 million immigrants, i.e. 94.1% of the total. About 2.1 million of those immigrants did not report their country of origin. We have accurate information on educational attainment and origin for 35.385 million immigrants, i.e. 88.8% of the OECD adult immigration stock (to be compared with 38.5% in the US Census).
In the 22 countries (20 Censuses/Registers, Italy and Greece) where data on educational attainment are available, age bounds are identical to those of 2000. The concept of citizenship must only be used for Germany and for all other countries where Census and register data are not available.
Step 2 -Emigration rates
The second step consists in comparing the emigration stocks to the number of remaining residents in the source country for the same three educational categories mentioned above. Calculating the brain drain as a proportion of the total educated labor force is a better strategy to evaluate the pressure imposed on the local labor market. It is indeed obvious that the pressure exerted by 1,096 thousand Indian skilled emigrants (4.5% of the educated total labor force) is less important than the pressure exerted by 76 thousand Surinamese (90.1% of the educated labor force). This step requires using data on the skill structure of the adult population in the countries of origin. Denoting N j t;s as the stock of individuals aged 25+, of skill s in country j, at time t, we de…ne the emigration rates by in 2000) , we use the World Bank data on the population aged 25 and over and transpose the skill sharing of the bordering country with the closest GDP per capita. Note that the World Bank database provides the GDP per capita in PPP value for 155 countries. For a limited number of countries, the population aged 25 and over has been estimated by applying the share of the 25+ observed in the geographical area to the total population size. We believe these two assumptions give good approximations of the brain drain rate, broadly consistent with anecdotal evidence.
Speci…c assumptions in release 1.0
Obtaining Census and Register data from all OECD countries is a long process involving numerous exchanges of information. Before data are available in the …nal desired format, adequate estimates can be provided on the basis of Survey data. This
The last column in Table 1 Such temporary assumptions 11 induce two major shortcomings. First, European Council data must be used for 10 countries. These data are based on the concept of citizenship (rather than country of birth). In all cases, information on the birth country will be available from the national Censuses. Second, the Labor Force Survey list of country of origin is usually less detailed than the Census list. The survey distinguishes 22 countries of origin and 10 groups of countries in 1990, 26 countries of origin and 13 groups of countries in 2000. The most striking example is Africa, which is divided in three groups (South Africa, Northern Africa and Other Africa). We compute the skill structure of emigration for these groups of countries and consider it as homogenous within groups. Despite this limitation, we attempted to a comparison between Labor Force Survey and Census data for France and obtained very accurate estimates for most African countries.
Note that we also use the Labor Force Survey to eliminate immigrants aged under 25. For countries where detailed data are not available, the share of young immigrants is also assumed to be homogenous within groups. 11 The …nal database for 1990 and 2000 should be available by December 2004. 
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To make comparisons possible, we compute information for ex-Yugoslavia, for the ex-USSR and ex-Czechoslovakia in 2000. The column "reliability rate" provides, for each sending country, the proportion of emigrants for which accurate information about education attainment has been collected (from the total number of individuals declared as emigrants from that country). In a large majority of cases, the reliability rate is higher than 90 percent. Changes between 1990 and 2000 are given in the last two columns, but only for countries showing a high reliability rate in 1990 and 2000 (the minimal threshold is set at 70 percent).
Situation in 1990
Situation 
Gross results
Our results indicate that skilled workers are much more concerned by international migration. At the world level in 1990, high-skill immigrants represented 33 percent of the OECD immigration stock whilst only 9.1 percent of the world labor force was tertiary educated. Between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of skilled immigrants increased to 37 percent. The proportions are more impressive for Africa and Asia where the skill structure of emigration is much higher than the skill structure of the domestic labor supply: The same conclusion holds in terms of emigration rates by educational attainment. As shown in …gure 1, although there is a close relationship between these two rates, the emigration rate of skilled workers is higher than the total emigration rate in all countries. In 2000, the world-wide average emigration rate of skilled workers was 5.47 percent, 3.3 times larger than the average emigration rate of all workers (1.66%) and 5.8 times larger than the emigration of unskilled workers. By disregarding illegal migration, we obviously underestimate global and unskilled migration rates.
The emigration of skilled workers is particularly high in some parts of the world. Figure 2 gives a world map representation of the emigration rate of skilled workers. the darker the areas, the more a¤ected it is by the brain drain. Clearly, Central America (including the Caribbean), South Eastern Asian countries and a chain of countries in Western and Eastern Africa experience a tremendous out ‡ow of their skilled labor force to the OECD. The brain drain increased between 1990 and 2000. The world-wide average emigration rate of skilled workers increased by .75 percentage points over that period, against .41 for medium skilled workers and .06 for the low skilled. With Mexico (+3.2 points) and Guatemala (+3.9 points), Central America is more and more a¤ected by the migration of skilled workers. However, it is in Western, Eastern and Central Africa that the brain drain increased the most severely. Countries experiencing the largest increases are Angola (+18.4 points), Equatorial Guinea (+29.7 points), Ghana (+9.2 points), Sao Tome and Principe (+25.9 points), Guinea-Bissau (+23.5 points), 
Comparison with previous study
Carrington and Detragiache's study clearly initiated new debates on the size and the distribution of the brain drain. Our purpose is to re…ne their method by incorporating additional statistical sources. By collecting Census, Register and Survey data from all OECD countries, we eliminate two sources of bias:
² Relying on OECD statistics on immigration brings on several problems. First, in 1990, these data only provided information on the country of origin for the top-10 or top-5 sending countries. Hence, small sending countries are usually not identi…ed, at least in the majority of receiving countries. Second, immigration in EU countries is based on the concept of citizenship rather than on country of birth. Third, immigration data are missing for a few OECD countries (Greece, Iceland, Mexico, Slovakia, Turkey). Finally, the OECD provides data on the total immigration stock rather than on the adult immigration stock (which can be compared with the labor force in sending countries). Compared to national Censuses, we estimate that relying on OECD statistics implies an average underestimation in skilled workers migration rates by 11.3% in 1990 and 10.6% in 2000. This is the major source of bias, especially for small sized countries which are usually not identi…ed as important sending countries;
² Transposing the US educational structure on other OECD countries induces an average overestimation in skilled workers migration rates by 7.25% in 1990 and 6.22% in 2000. The bias is obviously strong in countries sending a minor part of their emigrants to the US.
On average, Carrington and Detragiache's method underestimates the emigration rates of skilled workers by 4% in 1990 and 4.4% in 2000. This appears in …gure 3 (…g 3.A and 3.B) which gives skilled migration rates evaluated under three measurement methods: (i) a method fully based on Censuses and administrative data (our method), (ii) a method based on OECD statistics and US educational attainment data (Carrington and Detragriache), (iii) an intermediate method based on Census/administrative data and US educational attainment data. In comparison to the Census method, the second method clearly underestimates the brain drain for a large majority of countries. On the contrary, the third method overestimates the brain drain.
The two sources of bias cancel each other in a couple of cases. However, the brain drain is particularly overestimated in countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey, Somalia. By transposing the educational structure observed in the US, Carrington and Detragiache and Adams obtain high emigration rates of tertiary education workers for these countries (between 55 and 65 percent for North Africa and Turkey). Taking into account the low level of education observed among emigrants to Europe (where the large majority of these migrants live), we obtain much lower skilled emigration rates (between 5 and 10 percent). On the contrary, the brain drain is strongly underestimated in countries such as the Gambia, Madagascar, Gabon, Brunei, Papua New Guinea. These countries send a relatively small number of emigrants to non-US areas. They are usually not identi…ed in the OECD migration statistics. Consequently, their emigration rates are largely underestimated.
The last …gure (…g 3.C) represents the percentage of emigrants on the basis of which educational attainment is extrapolated (let us call this proportion a "reliability rate"). On average, our method is based on 92.7 percent of observations. A method relying on US educational attainment is based on 44.1 percent of observations. However, the reliability rate is heterogenous bewteen countries. Figure 3 .C represents the number of reliable country estimates as a function of the reliability criterion required by any user of the database. The function is obviously decreasing: the number of reliable observations decreases with the degree of reliability imposed by the user. For example, setting the reliability rate at 80 percent, our database provides 175 reliable country observations in 2000 (160 reliable observations in 2000). Transposing the US immigration structure to the total stock of immigrants, we would only provide 23 reliable observations in 2000 (22 countries in 1990) at the same reliability rate. By extending the number of observations and their degree of reliability, our method provides useful material to examine the changes in the international distribution of migration rates, to test for the (push and pull) determinants of migration per skill group or to evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of migration on source and destination countries.
Key indicators
Let us summarize the results by a few …gures.
Immigration structure in OECD areas. The intensity of the brain drain clearly depends on the structure of immigration in OECD countries. Figure 4 describes that structure. In …gure 4.A, it clearly appears that the US is the major destination country for skilled workers. The proportion of OECD educated migrants residing in the US increased from 48 percent to 53 percent between 1990 and 2000. The European Union is the second destination, attracting 16.3 percent of the educated in 2000 and 15.2 in 1990 (the migration between European countries is counted), just above Canada (13.9 percent in 2000 and 15.7 in 1990) . Figure 4 .B shows that the proportion of skilled immigrants in the total immigration stock is very high in Canada (58 percent). It is lower in Australia (46 percent) and the US (44%), and quite low in the European Union (22 percent). Such disparities are due to the historical composition of immigration ‡ows over the last decades. Focusing on the variation between 1990 and 2000 (capturing recent immigration policies), it appears that the rise in educational attainment of immigrants has been very strong in Australia and, to a lesser extent, in Canada, compared to the US and Europe. These trends are compatible with the stylized facts and policy measures presented in the introduction. Who is su¤ering from the brain drain? Table 3 gives the 30 most a¤ected countries in 2000. Of course, the intensity of brain drain di¤ers if it is measured in absolute or relative terms. In absolute terms (number of educated emigrants), the largest countries are obviously strongly a¤ected by the brain drain. The stock of skilled emigrants is high in the Philippines, India, China, Mexico and Vietnam but also in developed countries such as the UK and Germany, Canada or Italy. In relative terms (as a proportion of the educated labor force), small countries with a population below 4 million are the most a¤ected. The emigration rate exceeds 80 percent in nations such as Suriname, Guyana, Haiti and Jamaica. One could argue that the distance from the US is a key element explaining the high emigration rates from these countries. Nevertheless, we believe that reality is much more complex. First, a simple regression of emigration rates on distances (in logs) to the closest OECD country reveals that distance cannot explain country di¤erences (the slope is not signicantly di¤erent from zero for the subset of small countries with population below 4 million 12 ). Second, although being close to the US, countries such as Suriname send most of their migrants to other countries (the Netherlands): historical, cultural, linguistic and colonial ties are potentially important. Formal tests would be required to assess the role of push and pull factors in the international mobility of skilled workers.
Excluding small sized countries (population below 4 million), column 3 stresses the importance of the brain drain in Africa and Central America. On the Western and Eastern coasts of Africa, tremendous rates of emigration are found in nations such as Somalia, Ghana, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Nigeria or Madagascar. In Asia, Vietnam and Lebanon are the most a¤ected. Regarding Europe, emigration rates are particularly strong in two countries of ex-Yugoslavia (Croatia and Serbia) and in the United Kingdom. The last column in table 3 reveals that countries from the ex-USSR, South America and the Arab Gulf exhibit very small rates (as well as in Japan, France and the United States). Finally, it is worth noticing that developing countries with large stocks of skilled emigrants may exhibit low rates of emigration. This is obviously the case of India, China and Brazil. The world distribution of the brain drain. It is interesting to compute average migration rates by region, income group (the World Bank classi…cation distinguishes four categories) and size groups (above 25 million, between 10 and 25 million, between 4 and 10 million and below 4 million). It comes out that the distribution of emigration rates is strongly heterogenous within groups. For example, the disparities between the Caribbean countries and the US are tremendously high in America; large di¤erences are observed between high-income countries such as Malta, Ireland, Hong-Kong and, on the other hand, Australia, Japan or the USA. However, as shown in …gure 5, disparities in the average rates reveal interesting results.
Regarding the regional distribution (see …gure 5.A), the most a¤ected continents are Africa and Europe. Oceania and Asia exhibit intermediate rates whilst the average American brain drain is small. The regional disparities are extremely stable between 1990 and 2000. As for income groups (see …gure 5.B), it is worth noticing that the highest rates are observed in middle income countries. High income countries (less incentives to emigrate) and low-income countries (where liquidity constraint are likely to be more binding) exhibit the lowest rates. As reported in Schi¤ (1996) , liquidity constraints in poor and unequal societies explain the increasing relationship between income and migration at low income levels. Papers by Freeman (1993) , Faini and Venturini (1993) , Funkhouser (1995) , World Bank (1994) have shown that emigrants essentially do not come from low income group. It is worth noticing that between 1990 and 2000, the situation clearly improved in lower-middle income countries and deteriorated in low-income countries.
Finally, regarding size groups, we obtain a decreasing relationship between emigration rates and country population sizes. Disparities are also extremely stable over time. Our key indicators suggest that country size, GDP per capita, inequality and poverty rates are important determinants of emigration. Obviously, formal tests would be required to assess the relative e¤ect of selection, network e¤ects, economic, cultural, historical or political determinants of emigration. Whether these factors play di¤erently across skill groups is a crucial issue. 
Conclusion
Due to the poor quality of international data, assessing the economic impact of the brain drain is a challenging issue. Building on the seminal work of Carrington and Detragiache (1998) , this paper provides a new dataset on skilled emigration rates describing the loss of skilled workers in both developing and developed countries. By increasing the number of observations and improving their degree of reliability, our method provides useful material for econometric analysis of the causes and consequences of the brain drain.
In absolute terms, we show that the largest stocks of educated emigrants are from Europe, Southern and Eastern Asia and, to a lesser extent, Central America. Nevertheless, as a proportion of the local educated labor force, the highest rates are observed in Central America and Africa (on the Western and Eastern coasts). Between 1990 and 2000, these regions also experienced the strongest increase in brain drain.
Our dataset is obviously evolutionary. It can be improved in several ways:
² This release uses survey data when census data are not available yet. By incorporating new OECD censuses, we will improve the quality of our estimates;
² Adding immigration data from non-OECD countries (Gulf states, South Africa, Eastern Asia) would also strongly improve the quality of our estimates for the major countries involved (Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Namibia.);
² Repeating the exercise for 1980 would also ease the econometric exploitation of the database.
Despite these possible developments, we believe that the current version of our database delivers information that is rich enough to assess the changes in the international distribution of migration rates, to test for the (push and pull) determinants per skill group or to evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of migration on source and destination countries.
